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Introduction: conceptual assumptions 
Influential theories developed by North-American social scientists have frequently 
concentrated on the description and prescription of social categories having as 
referential contexts those of the USA and Canada. Some of those approaches —with 
universalist pretensions— has impinged upon interpretations made by other 
academics around the world in quite a spurious manner.  
Functional diffusionism, in particular, has persistently conveyed the idea that 
internal territorial differences within nation states were to disappear with the 
extension of liberal democracy and industrial capitalism. As communication of 
political, economic and cultural matters increased, the peoples of different regions 
would develop a new common identity, which would transcend their differences 
(Deutsch, 1966)[1]. Centre-periphery dichotomy was destined to decline as society 
became ‘modernised’ by means of elite-initiated policies aimed at achieving social 
standardisation (e.g. common language and citizenship). Likewise, cultural identities 
of ethnic groups and minorities would be replaced by a set of class-orientated 
conflicts, or conflicts among interest groups. Thus, modernisation was regarded to 
have brought about the idea of an all-embracing state national identity rooted in both 
cultural and civic axes. History has falsified repeatedly such analyses. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, all-embracing identities are openly questioned 
and have become problematic. While being corroded by the forces of globalisation 
they are also subject to fragmentation, competition and overlapping elements of a 
multiple and diverse nature. The discontinuity and dislocation of social 
arrangements provide that different identities —particularly, territorial— relate to 
each other in quite an unpredictable manner. In fact, identities are shared in various 
degrees by individuals and are subject to constant internalisation by group members 
(Giddens, 1991; Greenfeld, 1992; Melucci, 1989; Smith, 1991).  
A considerable problem arises on establishing boundaries and degrees to citizens’ 
self-identification, and on interpreting those causes for political mobilisation related 
to territorial identities. If a strengthening of meso-level identities is noticeable, a 
supranational level of civic membership and institutional development can also be 
perceived (e.g. europeanisation). This process of convergence can conciliate 
supranational, state and local identities in apparent conflict among themselves[2]. 
In this paper we deal primarily with the concept of ethnoterritoriality, which refers to 
a dimension where conflicts and political mobilisations are developed and have as 
chief social actors those ethnic groups that possess a geographical underpinning. 
Such a spatial reference is identifiable within the boundaries of a polity, usually of a 
compound or plural composition (Coakley, 1994; Moreno, 1988; Rudolph and 
Thompson, 1992). 
In plural societies individuals are tied to cultural reference groups which might be in 
competition among themselves (Barth, 1969). This results in a multiplicity of socio-
political identities, dynamic and often shared, which are not necessarily expressed 
explicitly. Therefore, identity markers are malleable and the intensity of their 
manifestation greatly depends upon contingent circumstances (Anderson, 1983; 
Brass, 1991; Cohen, 1992; Hobsbawm, 1990).  
The revival of ethnoterritorial political movements in the Western world has 
coincided with an increasing challenge to the centralist model of the unitary state 
(Keating, 1988; 1996). In the case of Spain, as in other pluriethnic states, regional 
devolution and federalisation seek to articulate a response to the stimuli of the 
diversity or plurality of society, comprising cultural/ethnic groups with differences of 
language, history or traditions which can also be reflected in the party system. 
Despite its secular ethnic conflicts, Spain is an entity clearly identifiable as a 
historical unity. This unity goes beyond the simple aggregation of territories and 
peoples with no other affinity than their coexistence under the rule of one common 
monarch or political power. However, the social and cultural cohesion that makes up 
Spain’s unity does not obliterate its internal oppositions. 
Both processes of state building and national-formation in modern Spain explain to a 
high degree how citizens express their territorial identities and institutional 
allegiances. During the XIX and XX centuries Spanish Liberals and Reformists 
carried out a programme of state nationalisation. But the profound attachment of 
Spaniards to their nationalities and regions remained not only firm but, in some 
cases, found renewed ways of cultural revival (e.g.. Catalonia’s Reinaxença).  
At present, the persistence of a dual identity or compound nationality in Spain 
reveals the ambivalent nature of their internal ethnoterritorial relations:  
"Spain ... is a state for all Spaniards, a nation-state for a large part of the 
Spanish population, and only a state but not a nation for important 
minorities" (Linz, 1975: 423). 
Consequently, Spanish citizens incorporate —in variable proportions— both 
local/ethnoterritorial and state/national identities. The degree of internal consent and 
dissent in decentralised Spain has in the concept of dual identity a useful 
methodological tool for socio-political interpretations[3]. 
Indeed, the quest for self-government by meso-level communities is in full 
accordance with the variable manifestation of such duality: the more the primordial 
ethnoterritorial identity prevails upon modern state identity, the higher the demands 
for political autonomy. Conversely, the more characterised the state-national identity 
is, the less likely it would be for ethnoterritorial conflicts to appear. At the extreme, 
complete absence of one of the two elements of dual identity would lead to a socio-
political fracture in the pluriethnic state, and demands for self-government would 
probably take the form of independence. In other words, when citizens in a sub-state 
community identify themselves in an exclusive manner, the institutional outcome of 
such antagonism will also tend to be exclusive.
It has been argued that political accommodation to secure political and institutional 
stability in pluriethnic societies or polyarchies is almost impossible. Furthermore, 
attempts made to achieve such a goal are bound to result in either the break-up of 
the state or the consolidation of a type of hegemonic authoritarianism for the control 
of the state's unity (Dahl, 1971; Horowitz, 1985)[4]. Contemporary liberal thinkers 
have greatly revitalised the debate regarding individual and collective rights. Most of 
them can be labelled as ‘liberal nationalists’ (Tamir, 1993). Some have persuasively 
argued on the case of multiculturalism and the politics of recognition for minorities. 
However, some of their normative analyses insist upon the unfeasibility of 
accommodating ethnonational groups within federations –as would illustrate the 
case of Quebec and Canada[5]. 
This papers sustains the view ethnoterritorial co-operation and agreement may not 
only overcome conflicts and divergence within plural polities, but can also provide a 
deepening of democracy by means of favouring citizens’ participation at all possible 
levels of institutional life and political decision-making. In the case of Spain, this 
development overlaps with its internal ethnoterritorial and cultural diversity. 
In the following section a succinct review and interpretation of some of the main 
developments in Spain's recent history will pave the way for a discussion of the 
Spanish model of multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence which is analysed 
subsequently.  
The last section of this paper focus on the growing role played by those meso-
communities in Europe which have been able to make compatible the general and 
the particular. This development seems to be in line with a trend towards a new 
cosmopolitan localism.  
Unity and diversity in contemporary Spain 
Spain is a plural national state made up of nationalities[6] and regions. Its territorial 
unity has been put under strain by the centrifugal action of its ethnoterritorial and 
linguistic diversity[7], as well as by that of either weak state institutions or, 
sometimes, by violent central rule. Moreover, there has been a traditional lack of 
congruence between political and economic powers. This ‘non-congruence’[8] has 
traditionally nourished the centrifugal tendencies present in modern Spanish history, 
tendencies that found expression in a number of armed conflicts. 
Centre and periphery in post-colonial Spain 
With the Restoration of the monarchy (1876-1923), and the centralising dictatorship 
of Primo de Rivera (1923-30) which followed, a new centrally led attempt to impose 
uniformity on the country reared its head, but it ended in failure. 
The establishment of universal male suffrage in 1890 had the notable effect of 
placing Catalan incipient nationalism, or Catalanisme, squarely in the Spanish 
political scene. A combination of disparity in Catalonia's social structures[9] and 
impoverished rural Spain was an important cause of the rise of Catalan nationalism. 
In particular, the differences between Spain's two major cities, Madrid and 
Barcelona, became increasingly evident[10]. 
The Basque Nationalist Party, founded by Sabino de Arana Goiri in 1895, was less 
successful than the Catalanist Lliga[11] in obtaining a class-wide support, partly 
because of its religious emphasis and its ethnocentric claims. Early Basque 
nationalism underlined traditional community values in opposition to bourgeois 
industrial society, the effects of which included a considerable influx into the Basque 
country of migrants from the rest of Spain. Primitive Basque essentialism of a racist 
character was the ideological basis of early Basque nationalism, which combined 
with powerful populist elements and religious exclusivism to produce a discourse 
quite distinct from that of Catalan nationalism. This latter ideology was more 
intellectual and less folkloric, and has always been less secessionist in character. 
The reason behind its having provoked greater resistance than Basque nationalism 
ought perhaps to be sought in the fact that it offered an alternative view of Spain, 
something which Basque nationalism has frequently turned its back on. Both 
nationalisms, however, could be seen as political manifestations of a vigorous and 
prosperous periphery, which contrasted with the often-parasitic centralism of the 
Spanish State to which it was subordinated. 
In other Spanish territories, regionalism came in different forms, in many cases 
stimulated by the action of the Catalan and Basque movements, and reflected the 
ethnoterritorial diversity of plural Spain. Partly as a consequence of the federal 
experience of the First Republic (1873), there were clamours for recognition in 
Galicia, Valencia, Andalusia, and Asturias. Chronologically, the appearance of 
explicit claims for regional autonomy in contemporary Spanish politics occurred in 
the years around the turn of the present century. 
The Second Republic, the Civil War, and the Franco dictatorship 
In spite of its short existence, the Second Republic (1931-39) contributed largely to 
the resolution of ethnoterritorial conflict. One of the most notable improvements was 
the constitutional design of state as a regional model, situated somewhere between 
a unitary and a federal state. This conceded statutes of autonomy to Catalonia[12], 
the Basque Country[13] and Galicia[14]. There is no doubt that the regional 
autonomy question also played a fundamental part in the political polarisation 
process before the Civil War (1936-39). Even within the republican forces the 
devolution issue created no little turmoil. 
The autonomist process, though incipient, was spreading throughout Spain by the 
time the Civil War broke out. With the victory of General Franco's forces, a long 
period of political centralisation ensued, aiming once again to create a uniform 
Spain. 
Two of the most notable pathological fixations of the Franco dictatorship (1939-75) 
were anti-communism and anti-separatism. The ‘sacred unity of the homeland’ was 
regarded as an indispensable unifying element and raison d'être of General Franco's 
despotic regime. To a large extent, Francoism justified itself through its ability to 
suppress and extirpate all forms of home-rule[15], regionalism and sub-state 
nationalism. Any form of federalism or wish for autonomy was understood by the 
Franco regime as ‘separatism’. 
The Francoist conception of national unity, at the expense of the cultural and ethnic 
variety of the people of Spain, degenerated into an obsessive dogma. In fact, the 
linguistic and cultural oppression of Francoism stimulated regionalism and 
peripheral nationalism in Spain. From the 1960s onward, autonomism intensified 
owing much of its emergence to the nature of Francoism. During the final years of its 
existence, the opposition to the regime developed a compact programme for 
democratic rights and for the political decentralisation of the Spanish State. In the 
so-called ‘‘historical nationalities’’ in particular (Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque 
Country), the forces opposed to Francoism were able to articulate a political 
discourse denouncing the absence of democracy and the continuous official attacks 
on their identities. In these communities, democratic and ethnoterritorial claims 
became inseparable. In this way the ideology of autonomism and political 
decentralisation made its way into Spanish democratic political consciousness. 
The 1978 Constitution and the decentralisation of power 
After Franco's death in 1975, the transitional process to democracy began in earnest. 
The democratic parties did not have a clear-cut model for the type of decentralised 
state they broadly advocated. However, the majority wanted home-rule for all the 
Spanish nationalities and regions. The constitutional expression of such a strong 
platform constituted a major political challenge, for Spanish modern history had 
witnessed tragic failures where ethnicity and the territorial sharing of power were 
concerned.  
The broad party political consensus which made the drawing up of the 1978 
Constitution possible, also brought with it an element of ambiguity in the formulation 
of the territorial organisation of the Spanish State. In fact, two different conceptions 
of Spain, which had traditionally confronted each other, were formulated. 
Subsequently, a middle way was negotiated and explicitly recognised by the 
Constitution: on the one hand, the idea of an indivisible Spanish nation-state, on the 
other, a concept of Spain as an ensemble of diverse peoples, historic nationalities 
and regions. 
The 1978 Spanish Constitution made it possible for one, three, all or none of the 
Comunidades Autónomas to be self-governing. It depended on the political will 
expressed by the inhabitants of each nationality or region, or by their political 
representatives. It also made it possible for the degree of self-government to be wide 
or restricted according to the wishes of the nationalities and regions. Conservatives, 
Centrists, Nationalists, Socialists and Communists hammered out an agreement for 
the implementation of the federalising Estado de las Autonomías. The accepted 
solution took the form of an unwritten pledge to extend the procedures of political 
transaction and consociationalism into the future.  
This open model of asymmetrical federalisation did not presuppose the ways and 
means by which the different spatial entities could finally be articulated. Thus, an 
implicit desire was expressed by the ‘Fathers’ of the 1978 Constitution to provide the 
procedures and degrees of self-government to be pursued by the nationalities and 
regions while allowing them a high degree of flexibility. The formulation of a clear 
division of powers based upon conventional’ federal techniques was, however, 
avoided. 
The construction of the Estado de las Autonomías had to follow a ‘top-down’ 
process of decentralisation. This way of doing things is just one of the options 
available in the development of federal systems. The result at the close of the 
twentieth century is not much more than a series of practices of a federal nature 
involving a series of politically competitive units. Even so, the full development of 
multilateral decision-making, or a genuine common exercise of three-tier 
government action (at central, regional and local levels simultaneously), remains to 
be seen. 
The decentralisation process embodied in the 1978 Spanish Constitution has 
undergone a long period of consolidation. The degree of autonomy for the Spanish 
nationalities and regions is considerable. This is illustrated by the evolution of the 
distribution of public expenditure in the three-tier system of government that is 
reproduced in the following table:  
Source: Spanish Ministry of Public Administrations 
Support for autonomy, apart from the Basque and Catalan communities, has been 
particularly strong in Andalusia and other regions (the Canary Islands, Galicia and 
Valencia)[16]. Certainly it is the case that some regions were ‘encouraged’ by their 
most prominent political parties to enter into the autonomist process. Some areas 
with no self-governing tradition whatsoever were suddenly inspired to claim home-
rule rights. These were mainly uniprovincial communities lacking ethnoterritorial 
specificity, unless they recognised their origins elsewhere, such as the cases of 
Cantabria, La Rioja, and even the province of Madrid. In some cases, the 
decentralisation process has entailed a break-off from the ethnoterritorial base of 
certain provinces. One of the consequences of this has been the creation of hybrids 
such as Castille-La Mancha or Castille and Leon. 
The cases of Navarre and the Catalan Countries (Països Catalans)[17] have 
exemplified the difficulties in setting clear boundaries in certain regions. The Catalan 
Countries are perceived as a whole with a composite identity deserving political 
treatment as such by not just pan-Catalanist parties, but by the usually more 
cautious President of the Catalan Government, Jordi Pujol, in his ‘federalist’ 
understanding of Spain[18]. 
For some Basque nationalists, Navarre is an integral part of their country that can 
never be given up. This is the claim made by both Herri Batasuna, the political 
branch of ETA, the Basque terrorist separatists, and ETA itself. However, for the 
majority of people of Navarre, however, the old kingdom has more than enough right 
to its own constitution. 
In general terms, at the end of this century, it can be said that the decentralisation 
process has been assimilated by most Spaniards. This reality legitimates its political 
expression. However, although far from over, the decentralisation process needs to 
gradually adapt to new forms of inter-governmental relations, especially at the level 
of institutional collaboration[19]. The articulation of institutional relations involving 
shared powers and responsibilities lies at the very base of the federal-like 
ethnoterritorial relations of Spain. 
Multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence in Spain 
The gradual establishment of the Estado de las Autonomías in Spain has generated a 
complex of relations which can be explained by the characterisation of a model of 
multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence (Moreno, 1995). Its defining traits incorporate 
social, economic and political elements in a dynamic manner and are, thus, the main 
constituent elements of the Spanish case of federalisation (Moreno, 1998 a/b). There 
19811 1984 1987 1990 1992 1997 19992
Central 87.3 75.6 72.6 66.2 63.0 59.5 54
Regional 3.0 12.2 14.6 20.5 23.2 26.9 33
Local 9.7 12.1 12.8 13.3 13.8 13.6 13
1 Beginning of the process of devolution 
2 Government’s estimates
are chiefly elements of asymmetry, heterogeneity[20] and plurality underlying the 
semantic interpretation of concurrence[21]. 
For the purposes of our discussion, a sequential categorisation is adopted. First, two 
'axioms' are identified to have an important impact in the Spanish situation, although 
they refer to general features that are common to most of the contemporary world’s 
decentralised and federal systems: (A) conflicting intergovernmental relations, and 
(B) the politicising of ethnoterritorial institutions. Secondly, two ‘premises’[22] are 
analysed in relation to the stage prior to the development of the Estado de las 
Autonomías: (C) the differential fact, and (D) the centralist inertia. Thirdly, three 
'principles' are considered to be the fundamental pillars upon which the 
organisational rationale of the 1978 Constitution rests, explicitly or implicitly: (E) the 
democratic decentralisation, (F) the comparative grievance, and (G) the inter-
territorial solidarity. Lastly, three 'rules' are assessed to be the most compelling 
elements in the social and political structuring of the open process of 
decentralisation in Spain: (H) the centrifugal pressure, (I) the ethnoterritorial 
mimesis, and (J) the inductive allocation of powers. These constituent elements 
which characterised the model of multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence in Spain are 
succinctly reviewed as follows: 
(A) The axiom of conflicting inter-governmental relations is associated to the political 
leanings and party political affiliations present at all levels of government and 
institutions representing territorial interests. Conflict and agreement are present in 
inter-governmental relations in Spain as in any other federal state. In many respects, 
it also provides a testing ground for Spain’s democracy. A climate of permanent 
political bargaining among local, regional and central governments is bound to 
remain as the most characteristic feature of the Spanish process of federalisation. 
Criticisms of the degree of dispersion and fragmentation of political life have been 
voiced in Spain. Some have proposed new forms of centralisation as 'solutions' to 
what is considered an unbearable situation. Such criticisms come from those who 
feel threatened by a sense of uncertainty and the changing nature of 
intergovernmental relations. These perceptions are not in tune with the 
constitutional precepts and their implications, which have guided the development of
the Spanish system of decentralised government. 
(B) The axiom of the politicising of ethnoterritorial institutions involves the wish, at 
all three levels of government, to maximise their political image and performance. 
This exercise of the meso-governmental patronage is not only carried out for 
domestic purposes but also, given the process of European convergence and the 
increasing inter-dependence of the world economy, also as the means of attracting 
interest and investment from abroad[23]. This is in line with the growing capacity of 
regional elites for negotiation. Their practices are legitimised by the constitutional 
order and are grounded in the increasing budgetary manoeuvrability of the 
governments of the Comunidades Autónomas. 
In any case, the European vocation made patent by all of the Spanish nationalities 
and regions is to be emphasised. In fact, some of the most powerful minority 
nationalisms in Spain (Basque, Catalan) regard the consolidation of the European 
Union as the most desirable scenario where the powers of central governments and 
the very idea of the nation-state would be in retreat. This is surely symptomatic of 
the ‘modernisation’ of ethnoterritorial diversity in Spain after the long stagnation of 
the Franco era. 
(C) In the early stages of the decentralisation process, the mobilisation patterns of 
the ‘‘historical nationalities’’ were founded on the premise of the differential fact. 
This idea is directed towards the Catalan, Galician and Basque cases, notable for 
their non-Castillian languages, and for their own cultures and specific histories. 
However, these last two elements are also common to the other Comunidades 
Autónomas. The expression differential fact is taken to refer to a feature or 
combination of features that characterise an ethnic group or community with respect 
to others. It is, therefore, a concept deriving its meaning from a not easily 
quantifiable subjective perspective that is rooted in the ethnicity or ethnic identity of 
a given people. 
Self-awareness of their own differential fact is a permanent incentive for the Basque 
Country, Catalonia and Galicia to maintain their institutional distinctiveness with 
relation to the rest of the Spanish regions. However, it is worth reminding that the 
socio-political mobilisation in Andalusia which led to the popular referendum of 
February 28, 1980, broke up a model —one implicitly accepted by the Basque and 
Catalan nationalist parties— which hardly offered a degree of de-concentration for 
the other Spanish regions. 
When the differential fact is seen in terms of politics and of the distribution of power, 
it displays an asymmetry which is not easy to interpret as regards the future 
development of the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías.  
(D) The premise of the centralist inertia is rooted in a long-standing perception that 
the central administration (erroneously identified with the state)[24] has supremacy 
over regional and local tiers of governments. This perception is the result not only of 
a tradition of dictatorial rule, which includes Franco's lasting dictatorship (1939-
1975), but also of the Jacobin view imported from France and embraced by the 
Spanish liberals during the 19th century. 
Thus, at the beginning of the decentralisation process a significant number of 
politicians and state officials disregarded demands, needs, and expectations of both 
regional and local administrations. They tried to discredit aspirations for home rule. 
But the decision of the Constitutional Court against the main provisions of the 
centralising LOAPA (constitutional law passed in Parliament in 1982 with the support 
of the two main parties in 1982, but fiercely opposed by the nationalists)[25] was a 
decisive setback for their attempts for re-centralisation. Since then, the whole 
process of regional autonomy has not been free from bureaucratic friction and 
interference, a result of this ingrained centralist mentality which still is well-extended 
among central bodies and institutions in Spain. 
(E) Paradoxically, Francoism was the main factor responsible for the subsequent 
development of the principle of democratic decentralisation. A unitary concept of 
Spain had been imposed through a defence of Spanish nationalism, taken from the 
totalitarian ideas and values of some of those who had ‘won’ the Civil War. In the 
eyes of many of those who had ‘lost’ the war, all things Spanish adopted an air of 
cultural genocide, political repression and the re-invention of history. As a 
consequence, many of the democratic forces were suspicious of the ‘Spanish’. 
During Francoism, and for nearly forty years, the ‘Spanish’ symbolism had tried to 
hide the plural reality of Spain. 
In the early 1970s, the democratic opposition forces to Franco's regime articulated a 
solid strategy of political action that amalgamated both the struggles for the 
recovery of democratic liberties and for the decentralisation of power. The quest for 
democracy and territorial home-rule, thus, went hand in hand.  
Political milieu for the development of peripheral nationalism, regionalism and 
autonomism can be regarded in this respect as an unwanted effect of hyper-
centralist Francoism. A large part of the growth in regional self-government during 
the 1970s and 1980s was due to the desire to establish democratic institutions, 
which brought decision-making closer to the people. Since then, the existence of 
democracy and freedom in Spain is inexorably linked to the continued protection 
and survival of power in a decentralised form, and the autonomy of the nationalities 
and regions. 
(F) The principle of comparative grievance determines to a large degree the 
mobilisation patterns of the Spanish Comunidades Autónomas. According to this, 
the right to autonomy and the subsequent political mobilisation is the result of an 
ethnic competition in search of equal access to the institutions of self-government. 
Furthermore, none of these regions wants to be left behind. This principle interacts 
in a conflictive manner with the premise of the differential fact claimed by the 
Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia. Perceptions like comparative grievance and 
the differential fact are not easily extensible to positive legislation in that they reflect 
social realities that are not necessarily quantifiable in financial or institutional terms. 
Comparisons may be made from perspectives such as that found in Catalonia, a 
comparatively richer community where the perception of a comparative fiscal 
grievance has traditionally manifested itself in the form of a strong argument in 
support of political Catalanisme. This perception is based on the idea that their 
community receives much less from the central administration than their total 
contribution to the state Treasury. This feeling of financial discrimination has not 
only been perceived as an obstacle to the later development of Catalonia, but, 
significantly, it has been traditionally interpreted as the negligence of an inefficient 
state apparatus which also fails to promote the growth of other less developed 
regions in Spain[26]. 
Localism in Spain, linked to a strong sense of ethnoterritorial pride, has continued to 
nourish both expectations and concerns of the Comunidades Autónomas. In 
particular, it has fuelled formal and informal mechanisms of political monitoring by 
which regions attempt to avoid any perception of being discriminated among 
themselves. 
(G) The principle of inter-territorial solidarity is not only a constitutional precept but 
also the formal expression of a more prosaic reality: the transfer of financial 
resources from the wealthier to the poorer regions of Spain. This aims at achieving a 
common basic level in the provision of services so that the standard of living of all 
Spaniards would be brought to the same level. Furthermore, the 1978 Constitution 
observes that the Spanish state must establish a just and adequate economic 
balance between the different areas of Spain (art. 138). 
With the gradual development of the 'home-rule-all-round' process in Spain, 
nationalities and regions regarded territorial autonomy not only as providing the 
means for bringing institutional decision-making closer to the citizens. Comunidades 
Autónomas, particularly the economically poorer territories, also laid emphasis on 
the constitutional principle of inter-regional solidarity. A financial instrument was 
created for this purpose, the Fondo de Compensación Interterritorial (Inter-territorial 
Compensation Fund), although the aim of re-distributing funds has largely been 
neglected due to the absence of any clear criteria of positive discrimination in favour 
of the poorer Comunidades Autónomas. Differences in management capacity, 
however, have brought about an incentive for the less-developed regional 
administrations to catch up with those more advanced in new policy design and 
provision. A ‘demonstration effect’ regarding the implementation of policies by the 
Comunidades Autónomas is noticeable[27]. 
(H) The political pressure exerted upon central power by both Basque and Catalan 
nationalisms decisively contributed in 1978 to the establishment of a constitutional 
accommodation, which implicitly recognised the multinational nature of Spanish 
society. Since then the rule of centrifugal pressure has been repeatedly 
instrumentalised by the most vigorous ethnoterritorial elites: Basque, Catalan, and 
Galician nationalists, first; regionalists in Andalusia, Navarre, Valencia and the 
Canary Islands, at a later stage. In recent times, a similar pattern is observable with 
respect to other regional parties and formations in Aragon, Cantabria or 
Extremadura[28]. Note that centrifugal pressure is meant to be used bot only as a 
vehicle for negotiation, but also to dissuade certain politicians and higher civil 
servants of the central administration from reverting to centralising tendencies. 
The continuous and active presence of representatives of the Catalan and Basque 
nationalist parties in the Spanish Parliament has been crucial in the consolidation an 
autonomist vision of the state with respect to the political relations between the three
levels of government. What is more, the increasing relative power of regional or 
federated organisations associated to national coalitions and parties has also 
decisively contributed the federalisation of politics in Spain[29]. 
The centrifugal effects of political negotiation on a territorial level in Spain tend to be 
multiplied by the bilateral relations between central and regional administrations. 
The practice of bilateralism, combined with comparative grievance, entails major 
difficulties for the Estado de las Autonomías, given that the seventeen Comunidades 
Autónomas will exert centrifugal pressures of every kind over questions of common 
interest[30]. 
(I) According to the rule of ethnoterritorial mimesis, the ‘historical 
nationalities’ (Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia) aspired to rights and powers 
comparable to those of the central administration, their own police force, external 
signs and ornamental emblems, official visits abroad, exclusive rights established by 
regional parliaments, public policies in the fields of health, education and social 
welfare, and so on[31]. Subsequently, a second group of Comunidades Autónomas 
wanted the same powers as the nationalities (such as Andalusia in 1981, followed by 
Valencia and the Canary Islands)[32]. Finally, these same communities became 
models for latecomer regions, which have tried to ‘imitate‘ the institutional outlook of 
early-rising nationalities and regions. 
In line with the concept of ethnoterritorial mimesis, it could be argued that Basque 
nationalism, especially in its most secessionist forms, has played with the idea of 
setting up an independent state for the Basque Country. Given the peculiar 
confederation of its historical territories, such a state would be paradoxically 
structured very much like plural Spain. Catalanisme, for its part, wants an 
independent fiscal system rather like the quota mechanisms currently operating in 
the Basque Country, if not simply a greater degree of financial autonomy. Galicia 
would probably follow Catalonia in having powers transferred from central state 
institutions. It should be noted, however, that the mechanicity of the mimetic process 
would remain relative to the extent to which citizens of the Basque Country identified 
themselves as "Spanish", at least to some significant degree, and that Catalanisme
maintained its tradition of being an inclusive nationalism which seeks to reform 
Spain as well as Catalonia. The strength of radical nationalism in Galicia does not 
seem to indicate anything like the collapse of a popular desire to belong to Spain as 
a whole. 
(J) The rule of the inductive allocation of powers in the Spanish process of 
decentralisation acknowledges the absence of a clear-cut constitutional division of 
powers in the three-tier system of government. This rule, which is implicit in the 
provisions of Title VIII of the 1978 Constitution, draws attention to the fact that the 
Spanish decentralisation process has followed an open model of territorial 
structuring, which only the passing of time has gradually defined, as it shall continue 
to do. 
The 1978 Constitution allows for great flexibility of interpretation where the 
possibility of self-government is concerned. It depends on the political will of each 
nationality or region. Furthermore, the constitutional adoption of a device that 
marked out the allocation of specific powers for the Comunidades Autónomas and 
the required procedure for their adoption, without establishing a clear separation of 
rights and powers, was the only feasible way to initiate a political decentralisation 
process. It must be remembered that during the transition to democracy this was 
one of the thorniest issues to reach agreement upon, and therefore required 
complete consensus. 
Once the seventeen Comunidades Autónomas had been established, a further 
delegation of powers was effected. Its degree of heterogeneity has levelled over 
time, although the process is far from over. In contrast to the traditional philosophy 
upon which other federal systems such as those of Germany, Australia, the USA or 
Switzerland have been modelled and built, the federalisation in Spain can only be 
regarded as complete once a period of intergovernmental familiarity has elapsed. At 
the same time, the process of European convergence will exercise considerable 
influence in the future distribution of regional powers and responsibilities. 
Meso-communities and the new cosmopolitan localism in Europe 
One of the visible effects brought about by financial globalisation is the relative 
obsolescence of the nation-state. The latter has constituted the central arena of the 
economic life during the last two centuries. At present, it often attends as a mere 
spectator the worldwide representation of virtual financial transactions. The one time 
powerful economic policies established at the national level are now severely 
restricted by those decisions taken by international trusts, pensions funds or 
‘whitened’ capitals from the transnational organised crime. Furthermore, 
globalisation affects also to other factors of production, such as components of 
industrial goods made in third countries, as well as the increasing legion of apatrid 
workers. 
Thus, globalisation brings with it a transfer of authority and power from the states to 
the markets. New rules of global markets and corporate strategies of multinational 
companies have a growing impact in setting the pace of both international and 
national patterns of economic development. Obviously, such markets rules and 
strategies are not territorially ‘neutral’. On considering the most profitable portfolios 
for investment, local incentives play an important role. But less-tangible factors, 
such as institutional and political stability, social cohesion or cultural and political 
affinities between place of origin and destination are also crucial.  
National governments negotiate among themselves in order to establish wide 
frameworks of economic transactions (GATT, EMU, TLC). In parallel they also 
negotiate with firms, and try to adjust to the consequences of the relationships 
between firms. State sovereignty is becoming more nominal than real. Furthermore, 
the capacities of national governments to pursue economic policies divergent to the 
rest of their neighbouring countries are severely limited[33]. 
Given this context of internationalisation, the role played by the meso-governments 
is acquiring relevance in most aspects of contemporary life. A renewal of community 
life at the meso-level derives mainly from the combination of two main factors: (a) A 
growing rejection to centralisation in unitary states coupled with a strengthening of 
supranational politics, and (b) A reinforcement of local identities and societal 
cultures with an territorial underpinning. This ‘new communitarism’ in Europe[34] 
affects not only to minority nations (Catalonia, Scotland), or new nation-states 
(Czech Republic, Slovenia), but also to regions and metropolitan areas (Brussels 
region, Greater London, Milan-Lombardy, Paris-Île de France). The latter seem to 
follow a pattern of re-creating those ‘medium-size’ political communities that 
flourished in the age prior to the New World discoveries (Italian city-states, 
Hanseatic League, principalities). However, and in contrast with the Renaissance 
period, there exists now a common institutional tie inherent to the process of 
europeanisation.  
Meso-governments are no longer dependent on those programmes of rationalisation 
carried out during the XIX and XX centuries by central bureaucracies and elites. 
Their own entrepreneurs, social leaders and local intelligentsia have taken up many 
of the initiatives and roles once reserved to those ‘enlightened’ actors holding the 
resorts of power at the centre of their nation states. Positions of political influence 
are now more evenly distributed in central, meso-level and local institutions. Co-
option of regional elites to the central institutions of government are no longer the 
exclusive routes available to ‘successful’ political careers.  
In the case of Europe, territorial identities are mainly pro-active. They are not mere 
mechanisms of response to control the informational avalanche generated by the 
telecom revolution. Some other functional identities linked to other dimensions of 
social life, such as cultural forms, gender, religion or individual sociobiological 
conditions, can be interpreted as new forms of ‘resistance’. Apparently, these do not 
seem to derive from those old identities present in the civil societies of the industrial 
age (Castells, 1997). 
In the UE context the reinforcement of sub-state territorial identities is deeply 
associated to powerful material and symbolic referents of the past (culture, history, 
territories). They seem to have engaged in a process of innovation departing from a 
commonality, which seeks to overcome the de-naturalising effects of global 
hypermodernity[35]. However, their manifestations do not take refuge in a reactive 
parochialism. The very idea of a ‘fortress Europe’ is not embraced as workable 
scheme. Furthermore, it appears to be in contradiction with the very cosmopolitan 
nature of local, national and supranational values in the Old Continent.  
Immigration from non-EU countries has certainly had an impact in the growing 
sentiments of xenophobia in Europe. Nevertheless, immigrants willing to take on 
those values of civic pluralism and tolerance find no major difficulties of insertion in 
the economic and social life at their first ‘port of entry’, i.e. local and meso-
communities. 
In the case of Spain, the process of home-rule-all-round has considerably allowed 
the extension of cosmopolitan localism. This is reflected in both societal interests 
aimed at developing a sense of local community, and at participating actively in 
international spheres. There is, thus, a growing congruence between the particular 
and the general. Note that all Spanish meso-governments have made explicit their 
European vocation. They all share the desire of majority of Spaniards for a EU that 
would be not only the main economic institutional locus at medium-term future, but 
which would also provide the legitimising bases for a future European citizenship. 
Conclusion 
At the turn of the millennium ethnoterritoriality has come to the fore of political life in 
democratic plural societies. The liberal nation-state is not only subject to pressures 
from ‘below’ but also from ‘above’. Among the latter, economic globalisation and the 
transfers of state power to both markets and supranational institutions are to be 
underlined.  
In Europe there is a revival of meso-communities. These are taking up initiatives and 
leading roles in many areas of social life. Governments at sub-state level are no 
longer subordinate to programmes of rationalisation being implemented by central 
bureaucracies and elites. Regional actors can perform a good many functions of 
those traditionally held by central elites. Authority, influence and power are in the 
process of re-distribution within and beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. 
Likewise, politicians and policies can have an impact in wider institutional 
frameworks even if their actions are initiated at local or regional levels.  
In sum, meso-communities have developed a new a cosmopolitan localism that 
combine, on the one hand, an active opposition to the centralised model of the 
unitary state and, on the other, a mobilisation of local identities coupled with an 
active supra-national participation. 
Political accommodation and institutional stability are regarded to be unsuitable for 
polyarchies according to the functionalist school of political science. Attempts to 
conciliate both goals have been argued to result in the break-up of the state or the 
consolidation of authoritarianism. The case of plural Spain offers an example of how 
multiple identities and political loyalties can be accommodated allowing 
ethnoterritorial co-operation and agreement among its constituent nationalities and 
regions. As the case of Spanish Comunidades Autónomas illustrates, multiple 
concurrence of territorial interests can not only overcome conflicts but can also 
provide a deepening of democracy by means of a closest access of civil society to 
political decision-making.  
Notes 
1 For William Safran, one of the prominent characteristics of American social science in general, and 
the behavioralist-functionalist school of political science in particular, is its ahistoricist bias. History 
is rejected on two grounds: "First...as a succession of events that…do not lend themselves to 
comparison and generalisation...Second…because it is associated with pre-modern (primitive) 
societies…" (1987: 13). ‘Mainstream’ Marxists have traditionally taken a functional approach to the 
analysis of political integration and modernisation (cfr. Connor, 1984).  
2 According to Pérez Agote, the fact that two identities can be referred to a larger entity does not 
preclude their possible relationship of incompatibility (1994: 311). That would be the case, for 
example, of both Basque and Spanish exclusive forms of self-identification However, the subsuming 
of the those identities under the European confines implies a nexus –even though it is not explicitly 
sought— of compatibility between them.  
3 In all seventeen Spanish Comunidades Autónomas there is a high proportion of citizens who claim 
some form of dual identity. The question addressed to them in the successive polls is as follows: ‘In 
general, would you say that you feel...(1) ‘Only Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, etc.’; (2) ‘More 
Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, etc. than Spanish’; (3) ‘As much Andalusian, Basque, Catalan as 
Spanish’; (4) ‘More Spanish than Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, etc.’; or (5) ‘Only Spanish’. In the 
period October 1990-June 1995 a degree of duality was expressed by around 70 per cent of the total 
Spanish population (i.e. categories 2, 3 and 4). Approximately 30 per cent of all Spaniards expressed a 
single identity (‘Only Spanish’, or ‘Only Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, etc.’). For an analysis of the 
case of Catalonia see Moreno and Arriba (1996).  
4 Robert Dahl’s position is in line with the views of Ernest Baker who also regarded political 
secessionism and authoritarianism as the two viable options in ethnocultural polyarchies. See 
Connor (1994: 124), and Linz (1973: 103-4).  
5 For Will Kymlicka ethnoterritorial accommodation would not constitute a stable political solution but 
a previous step to secession (1996: 45). Linz’s views are, instead, that federalism can consolidate 
liberal democracy in multinational states (1997). On multiculturalism cfr. Kymlicka (1995), Taylor 
(1992) and Walzer (1997). On Quebec and the Canadian Federation, cfr. Burgess (1990), Gagnon 
(1993), and McRoberts (1997).  
6 ‘Nationalities’ and ‘regions’ are the constituent territories of Spain according to the 1978 
Constitution. It is not easy to distinguish conceptually the term 'nation' from that of 'nationality'. Such 
a terminological distinction was to a great extent a consequence of the dichotomy between 'nation-
state' and 'state of the nationalities' as regards the cases of the Austria-Hungary and Ottoman 
Empires at the beginning of the twentieth century. In broad terms, nationality can be referred to as a 
minority nation which has acceded to a degree of institutional autonomy or independence within a 
multinational state and which concurs or co-exists with a majority nation and/or other ethnoterritorial 
groups. Cfr. Krejcí and Velímsky (1981: 32-43).  
7 Castillian, or Spanish as is usually referred to elsewhere, is the official language of the Kingdom of 
Spain. Approximately a fourth the Spanish total population of 40 million is bilingual. Their vernacular 
languages are also official in their respective territories: Catalan (spoken by 4.2 million in Catalonia; 
2.1 in Valencia; 0.2 in the Balearic Islands, and 0.05 in Aragon); Basque (0.7 million in the Basque 
Country, and 0.05 in Navarre); Galician (2.3 million). Other official languages, as declared in their 
regional Statutes of Autonomy, are Bable (spoken by 0.4 million in Asturias) and Aranese (0.004 in 
Catalonia) (Data collected from Sanmartí Roset, 1997: 67). There are also a number of dialects of the 
aforementioned languages widely spoken in other regions (Andalusia, Canary Islands, Extremadura, 
Murcia).  
8 The traditional political and economic non-congruence in Spain has been shown in a permanent 
rivalry between centre and periphery. This dichotomy has historically translated into two main 
alternative models of state organisation: centralist-authoritarian and federalist-democratic. Cfr. 
Gourevitch (1979) for the types of economic and political non-congruence.  
9 On the social structure of Catalonia, see Giner's monograph (1980). 
 
10 Between 1877 and 1920, the proportion of workers in Madrid working in industry over the city's total 
working population grew considerably from 18.4 to 42.5%, but remained behind Barcelona in this 
respect, with 37.1% in 1877 to 54% in 1920. Perhaps it was more significant that the proportion of 
‘unproductive’ middle classes in Madrid, consisting of civil servants, members of the Armed Forces 
and domestic staff (23.6% in 1877 and 15.3% in 1920), was greater than that of Barcelona (5.9% in 1877 
and 5% in 1920 (Data taken from Linz, 1967: 209).  
11 The Lliga Catalana, later Lliga Regionalista, was a Catalanist political party founded in 1901, later 
influential in Spain under the leadership of Francesc Cambó.  
12 On April 14th 1931 the Spanish Second Republic was proclaimed. On the same day the Catalan 
nationalist leader, Francesc Macià, declared a Catalan Republic and the creation of an Iberian 
Confederation. After negotiations, the Generalitat was re-established. The Generalitat is Catalonia's 
government, of medieval origin.  
13 Three days after the proclamation of the Second Republic, an assembly of Basque mayors gathered 
by José Antonio Aguirre, leader of the Basque Nationalist Party, claimed their right to autonomy 
within a Spanish federal republic, by the historic Oak of Guernica. Nevertheless, parliamentary 
approval of the proposal was thornier than the Catalan statute.  
14 In Galicia, the Organización Regional Gallega Autónoma (O.R.G.A., Autonomous Regional 
Organisation of Galicia), led by Santiago Casares Quiroga, had instigated the drafting of a proposal 
for autonomy. On June 28th 1936, a referendum was held and around 70% of the Galician electorate 
voted. The final result was 991.476 votes for and 6.805 against.  
15 With the partial exception of Alava and Navarre These two foral territories were able to keep their 
fiscal privileges as a ‘reward’ for the participation of many Carlists from those provinces who joined 
Franco’s forces during the Civil War (Giner and Moreno, 1990).  
16 After 15 years of deep political and administrative decentralisation, the assessment of the process 
made by the Spaniards was reflected in the following percentages: 11 per cent ("Totally positive"), 49 
per cent ("More positive than negative"), 21 per cent ("More negative than positive"), 10 per cent 
("Totally negative"), and 9 per cent ("Don’t Knows") (El País, November 19, 1995).  
17 'Catalan Countries’. Expression used by some to denote the Principate of Catalonia, the Kingdom of 
Valencia, and the Balearic Islands. Frequently included is Rosselló (Roussillon), in southern France, 
where Catalan is spoken.  
18 ‘In the specific case of Spain I could conceivably be a federalist, if the federation was based on 
genuine and authentic nationalities of the state, viz. Euskadi [Basque Country], Galicia, the whole of 
Castille, and the Catalan Countries (or just Catalonia, if Valencia and the Islands ... rejected being 
associated with the Principate)’. (Pujol, 1980: 26).  
19 According to 1990 data, most Spaniards were of the opinion that relations between regional 
governments and central government should be ‘collaborative’ (80.7%), and involving ‘shared 
responsibilities’ (58.2%). (M. García Ferrando et al, 1994: 113).  
20 Asymmetry and heterogeneity, both de jure and de facto, are particular traits in the process of 
Spanish ‘federalisation’ (Moreno, 1997a/b). On internal national differences and the operationalisation 
of asymmetrical federalism in Spain, cfr. Requejo (1996).  
21 According to Karl Popper (1976) a situation of concurrence can and ought to be explained as an 
unintentional consequence (usually unavoidable) of the human actions (conscious and planned) of 
the competitors. These aim at having the monopoly with no further competition. But in a situation of 
concurrence there is no compulsion to eliminate other concurrent actors.  
22 The term premise is meant to be understood as the foundation upon which a subsequent unfolding 
of events is derived. The terms axiom, premise, principle and rule should not be regarded as the 
constituent parts of a philosophical syllogism or as propositions in some logical proof.  
23 For instance, on the occasion of the 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona, the Catalan Government of 
the Generalitat financed full-page advertisements in the international press with the aim of drawing 
attention to the idea that the city’s geographical location is in Catalonia, further placed in a peninsular 
and European context. Similarly financed publicity has appeared since in other international media, 
including a Website in internet.  
24 The very term state is ambiguously employed in the text of the Constitution. In some Articles (1, 56, 
137, and, significantly, in the very title of Title VIII) the intention is for the term to denote the entire 
organisation of the Spanish legal-political system. Thus, the term covers the regional administrations 
as well as the other agencies and autonomous bodies that make up the state. In other constitutional 
articles (3.1, 149 and 150), the state is considered synonymous with the institutions of the central 
administration, together with their peripheral administrations, which may on occasions clash with 
autonomous administrations. The Constitutional Court's judgement of July 28, 1981, clarified the 
semantic conflict by asserting that the state must be regarded as a composite whole which includes 
all the institutions of central, regional and local governments. Whatever the case, a certain mentality 
persists among some.  
25 After the attempted military coup of February 23, 1981, influential sectors of the centre-right UCD 
and the socialist PSOE (then government and main opposition parties, respectively) tried to 
’harmonise’ the decentralisation process in the style of German federalism. The mistake was to 
believe that this could be achieved from the all-encompassing vision of the central state 
administration. The Constitutional Court annulled most of the provisions of the LOAPA, and upheld 
the principle of regional autonomy. This reinforced the legitimacy of the Court, which was to become 
a pivotal institution in the consolidation of democracy in Spain.  
26 Curiously, Madrid paid up more in taxes than any other community in 1989. Madrid "…has five 
million inhabitants, compared with Catalonia's six, but in 1989, the takings for Madrid reached 3.3 
billion pesetas, higher than Catalonia's 1.87 billion. In the same year, Andalusia, with seven million 
inhabitants, paid 0.61 billion, while Valencia, with only four million inhabitants, approached this figure, 
with 0.54 billion [...] In all the major taxes, the first place corresponds to Madrid, in spite of having a 
million inhabitants less than Catalonia and a similar income. The difference is striking in the case of 
the IRPF [personal income tax]: in 1989, 1.01 billion pesetas compared to 0.7 billion." (Platón, 1994: 
210).  
27 An illustration of this is provided by the Family Minimum Income Programme. This was introduced 
in the Basque Country in March 1998 to combat poverty and situations of social exclusion, and 
constituted a precedent in the subsequent programmes of minimum income benefits implemented in 
all 17 Comunidades Autónomas. Although showing a degree of diversity in policy design and 
coverage, programmes of ‘minimum income’ developed by the Spanish ‘‘historical nationalities’’ and 
regions aim at combining cash benefits with policies of social insertion (employment promotion and 
vocational training schemes, primarily).  
28 Among the local parties that have obtained parliamentary representation in Madrid, or in their 
regional parliaments, the following may be mentioned: Chunta, Coalición Canaria, Convergencia de 
Demócratas Navarra, Extremadura Unida, Partido Andalucista, Partido Aragonés, Partido Regionalista 
de Cantabria, Partido Riojano, Partido Socialista de Mallorca, Partiu Asturianista, Unión Alavesa, 
Unión Mallorquina, Unión para el Progreso de Cantabria, Unión del Pueblo Leonés, and Unión 
Valenciana.  
29 The organic federal composition of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE, Socialists and 
Social Democrats) and Izquierda Unida (IU, Communists, Radical Socialists and Independent Leftists), 
as well as the regionalisation of the Partido Popular (PP, Conservatives and Christian Democrats), 
and the electoral success of new regional movements has reinforced the crucial importance of the 
spatial element in Spanish politics.  
30 Intergovernmental co-operation of considerable political value has been initiated by conferences 
involving the central government and the Comunidades Autónomas. Even at the level of consultation, 
these conferences are vital to the articulation of policies discussed, agreed by consensus, or only 
partially agreed.  
31 In recent times Catalan nationalists has insisted in the idea of a ‘shared sovereignty’. They have 
sought the support of Basque and Galician democratic nationalists, and proposed a confederal model 
of political accommodation as in Switzerland (El País, March 15, 1998).  
32 Already in 1984, Joan Lerma (President of the Valencian Government) considered that there were 
not three ‘‘historical nationalities’’, but six Comunidades Autónomas with different levels of powers: 
"... they are allowed to get to the same place, and in particular I have to emphasise that the legal 
treatment for Catalonia and the Basque Country is the same as that for Galicia, but also for Andalusia, 
the Canaries and for ourselves [the Valencians]" (La Vanguardia, April 16, 1984).  
33 Even in France, where indicative planning was used by the state as a powerful instrument to beat 
the business cycle, the experience of the Mitterrand Government in the early 1980s put into evidence 
the feasibility of implementing economic policies independently of the fashion adopted by most of the 
European Governments of the time. According to Susan Strange: "Neither the control over interest 
rates nor the country’s balance of payments are left under the authority of governments. Even 
competition policy, like property rights and protected financial services, may come under pressure to 
conform to standards set outside the state" (1995: 299).  
34 Quite distinct from that prescribed in North America (Etzioni, 1993). Many of the incipient 
communitarian experiences in the United States may be regarded as reactions to specific social 
cleavages (criminalisation of social life), as instrumental means of socialisation (overcoming 
suburban constraints), or as alternative lifestyles to dominant values (possessive individualism).  
35 De-naturalising is used here as meaning the deprivation of the rights of citizenship within an 
established democratic polity.  
References 
Anderson, Benedict (1983), Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso. 
Barth, Fredik (ed.) (1969), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural 
Difference. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co. 
Brass, Paul (1991), Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison. New Delhi: Sage. 
Burgess, Michael (ed.) (1990), Canadian Federalism: Past, Present and Future. Leicester: Leicester 
University Press. 
Castells, Manuel (1997) The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Volume II: The Power of 
Identity. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell. 
Coakley, John (1992), ‘Conclusion: Nationalist Movements and Society in Contemporary Western 
Europe’ in Coakley, John (ed.), The Social origins of Nationalist Movements, pp. 212-230. 
London: SAGE/ECPR. 
Cohen, Anthony (1992), The Symbolic Construction of Community (1st Ed.: 1985). London: Routledge.
Connor, Walker (1984), The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Connor, Walker (1994), Ethnonationalism. The Quest for Understanding. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton 
University Press. 
Dahl, Robert (1971), Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press. 
Deutsch, Karl (1966), Nationalism and Social Communication (2nd Ed.). New York: M.I.T Press. 
Etzioni. Amitai (1993), The Spirit of Community. Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian 
Agenda. New York: Crown. 
Gagnon, Alain-G. (ed.) (1993), Québec: State and Society. Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada. 
García Ferrando, Manuel; López-Aranguren, Eduardo and Beltrán, Miguel (1994), La conciencia 
nacional y regional en las España de las Autonomías. Madrid: CIS. 
Giddens, Anthony (1991), Modernity and Post-Modernity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Giner, Salvador (1980), The Social Structure of Catalonia. The Anglo-Catalan Society Occasional 
Publications: University of Sheffield. 
Giner, Salvador (1984), ‘Ethnic Nationalism, Centre and Periphery in Spain’, in Abel, Christopher and 
Torrents, Nissa (eds.), Spain: Conditional Democracy, pp. 78-99. London: Croom Helm. 
Giner, Salvador and Moreno, Luis (1990), ‘Centro y periferia: la dimensión étnica de la sociedad 
española’ in Giner, Salvador (ed.), España. Sociedad y Política, pp. 169-197. Madrid: Espasa 
Calpe. 
Gourevitch, Peter (1979), ‘The Re-emergence of 'Peripheral Nationalisms': Some Comparative 
Speculations of the Spatial Distributions of Political Leadership and Economic Growth’, 
Comparative Studies in Sociology and History, vol. 21, pp. 303-322. 
Greenfeld, Liah (1992), Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity. London: Harvard University Press. 
Hobsbawm, Eric (1990), Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Horowitz, Donald (1985), Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press. 
Keating, Michael (1988), State and Regional Nationalism. Territorial Politics and the European State. 
Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Keating, Michael (1996), Nations Against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, 
Catalonia and Scotland. London: Macmillan. 
Krejcí, Jaroslav and Velímsky, Vítezslav (1981), Ethnic and Political Nations in Europe. London: 
Croom Helm. 
Kymlicka, Will (1995), Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Kymlicka, Will (1996), ‘Federalismo, nacionalismo y multiculturalismo’, Revista Internacional de 
Filosofía Política, no. 7, pp. 20-54. 
Linz. Juan (1967), ‘The Party System of Spain: Past and Future’, in Lipset, Seymour and Rokkan, Stein 
(eds.), Party Systems and voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New York: Free 
Press, pp. 197-282. 
Linz, Juan (1973), ‘Early State-Building and the Late Peripheral Nationalisms against the State: the 
Case of Spain’ in Eisenstadt, Samuel and Rokkan, Stein (eds.), Building States and Nations. 
Models, Analyses and Data across Three Worlds. 2 vols., pp. 32-116. Beverly Hills, Ca.: SAGE. 
Linz, Juan (1975), ‘Politics in a Multi-Lingual Society with a Dominant World Language: The case of 
Spain’, in Savard, Jean-Guy and Vigneault, Richard (eds.), Les états multilingues: problems et 
solutions. Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, pp. 367-444. 
Linz, Juan (1997), ‘Democracy, multinationalism and federalism’. Paper presented at the IPSA 
Conference (August), Seoul. 
McRoberts, Kenneth (1997), Misconceiving Canada. The Struggle for National Unity. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Melucci, Alberto (1989), Nomads of the Present. London: Hutchinson Radius. 
Moreno, Luis (1988), ‘Identificación dual y autonomía política’, Revista Española de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas, no. 42, pp. 155-174. 
Moreno, Luis (1995), ‘Multiple Ethnoterritorial Concurrence in Spain’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 
Vol. 1 (1), pp. 11-32. 
Moreno, Luis (1997a), La federalización de España. Poder político y territorio. Madrid: Siglo XXI. 
Moreno, Luis (1997b), Federalism: The Spanish Experience. Pretoria: HRSC: 
Moreno, Luis and Arriba, Ana (1996), ‘Dual Identity in Autonomous Catalonia’, Scottish Affairs, no. 17, 
pp.78-97. 
Pérez-Agote, Alfonso (1994), ‘Un modelo fenomenológico-genético para el análisis comparativo de la 
dimensión política de las identidades colectivas en el Estado de las Autonomías’, in 
Beramendi, Justo; Máiz, Ramón and Núñez, Xosé (eds.), Nationalism in Europe. Past and 
Present. Santiago de Compostela: Universidad de Santiago, pp.307-323. 
Platón, Miguel (1994), La amenaza separatista. Mito y realidad de los nacionalismos en España. 
Madrid: Temas de Hoy. 
Popper, Karl (1976), ‘The Logic of the Social Sciences’, in Adorno, Theodor et al, The Positivist 
Dispute in German Sociology, pp. 87-104. New York: Harper & Row. 
Pujol, Jordi (1980), Construir Catalunya. Barcelona: Pòrtic. 
Requejo, Ferran (1996), ‘Diferencias nacionales y federalismo asimétrico’, Claves de Razón Práctica, 
no. 59, pp. 24-37. 
Rudolph, Jr., Joseph R. and Robert J. Thompson (1989), Ethnoterritorial Politics, Policy and the 
Western World. Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner. 
Safran, William (1987), ‘Ethnic Mobilization, Modernization, and Ideology: Jacobinism, Marxism, 
Organicism and Functionalism’, The Journal of Ethnic Studies, Vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 1-31. 
Sanmartí Roset, J.M. (1997), Las políticas lingüísticas y las lenguas minoritarias en el proceso de 
construcción de Europa. Vitoria-Gasteiz: Instituto Vasco de Administración Pública. 
Smith, Anthony (1991), National Identity. London: Penguin. 
Strange, Susan (1995), ‘The Limits of Politics’, Government and Opposition, Vol. 30 , no. 3, pp. 291-
311. 
Tamir, Yael (1993), Liberal Nationalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Taylor, Charles (1992), Multiculturalism and ‘The Politics of Recognition’: an essay. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
Walzer, Michael (1997), On toleration. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
Revised version of the paper presented at the conference In Search of Justice and Stability: Liberal 
Justice and Political Stability in Multinational Societies, 26-28 March 1998, McGill University, Group of 
Research on Multinational States, North Hatley, Quebec, Canada. Published in Gagnon, A.-G. & Tully, 
J. (eds.), Multinational Democracies, pp. 201-221, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.  
[CSIC] [IESA Madrid] [Working Papers] 
